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A B S T R A C T
Based on data on listed firms in the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share stock markets from 2007 to 2015,
this study examines the relations among the quality of internal control, product-market competition and
audit opinions. The empirical results reveal that (1) the better the quality of the internal control of listed
firms is, the more likely a certified public accountant will be to issue a unmodified opinion; (2) the product-
market competition is positively associated with unmodified opinions; (3) the product-market competition
weakens the positive relation between the quality of the internal control of listed firms and the likelihood
that a unmodified opinion will be issued by a certified public accountant; and (4) the significant impact
of product-market competition on the relation between internal control quality and unmodified opinions
exists only in non-monopoly industries.
©2019 ASEPUC. Published by EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Competencia en el mercado de productos, control interno de calidad y opiniones
de auditoría. Evidencia de empresas chinas que cotizan en bolsa
R E S U M E N
Sobre la base de los datos de las empresas que cotizan en los mercados bursátiles A de Shangai y Shenzhen
entre 2007 y 2015, este estudio examina las relaciones entre la calidad del control interno, la competencia
en el mercado de productos y las opiniones de auditoría. Los resultados empíricos revelan que (1) cuanto
mejor sea la calidad del control interno de las empresas que cotizan en bolsa, más probable es que un
contador público certificado emita una opinión sin modificaciones; (2) la competencia en el mercado de
productos se asocia positivamente con las opiniones sin modificaciones; (3) la competencia en el mercado
de productos debilita la relación positiva entre la calidad del control interno de las empresas que cotizan
en bolsa y la probabilidad de que un contador público certificado emita una opinión sin modificaciones; y
(4) el impacto significativo de la competencia en el mercado de productos sobre la relación entre el control
interno de la calidad y las opiniones sin modificaciones sólo existe en las industrias no monopolísticas.
©2019 ASEPUC. Publicado por EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. Este es un artículo Open Access bajo la
licencia CC BY-NC-ND (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
The effectiveness of the capital market depends on reliab-
ility, transparency and information sharing. Audit opinions
issued by certified public accountants (CPAs) provide evalu-
ations of the quality of accounting information and play an
important role in the development of capital markets. Audit
opinions reflect the fairness of firms’ financial statements and
their legitimacy and policy consistency. According to COSO
1992, maintaining the reliability of financial reports is one
of the three major goals of internal control. Therefore, the
establishment and maintenance of strong internal controls
will improve the quality of financial information and the re-
liability of financial reports and will ultimately increase the
probability that auditors will issue unmodified audit opinions
on financial reports. However, firms with poorer financial in-
formation may need to improve the quality of their inform-
ation by establishing strong internal controls. As a result of
such changes, auditors will be more likely to issue unmod-
ified opinions about these firms. This study examines the
impact of internal control quality on audit opinions.
Furthermore, intensive product-market competition forces
firms to implement beneficial governance and to create a
positive information environment. Firms can replace the in-
ternal controls with the product-market competition of ex-
ternal governance mechanisms to improve the quality of cor-
porate information. Xiao and Li (2012) and Mahdi et al.
(2017) find that in a highly competitive market, sound in-
ternal governance is not significant, suggesting that product-
market competition creates an alternative relation with cor-
porate governance. Thus, this study investigates the impact
of product-market competition on audit opinions.
Based on accounting information on listed firms in the
Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share stock markets from 2007 to
2015, this study investigates the relations between the qual-
ity of internal control, product-market competition and audit
opinions. The study first examines the influence of internal
control and product-market competition on audit opinions.
Then, the study focuses on the effect of product-market com-
petition and internal governance mechanisms on audit opin-
ions. Finally, the study examines the influence of internal
and external governance mechanisms on audit opinions in
monopoly and non-monopoly industries.
This study empirically finds that (1) the internal control
quality of listed firms is positively related to the likelihood
that unmodified opinions will be issued by CPAs; (2) product-
market competition is positively associated with the likeli-
hood that unmodified opinions will be issued by CPAs; (3)
the product-market competition weakens the positive rela-
tion between the quality of the internal control of listed firms
and the likelihood that an unmodified opinion will be issued
by a certified public accountant; and (4) the significant im-
pact of product-market competition on the relation between
the quality of internal control and audit opinions exists only
in non-monopoly industries. The product-market competi-
tion (the external governance mechanism) fails to exert ef-
fective governance in monopoly industries.
This study contributes to the literature on the economic
consequences of internal control mechanisms by presenting
a new perspective. Most prior studies that examine internal
control quality are based on the US SOX Act. This study
provides evidence for emerging countries and their internal
control mechanisms. The compulsory auditing quality of in-
ternal control under the SOX 404 clause promotes the quality
of internal control and the protection of investors. The SOX
Act was introduced in China in 2006. Chinese listed firms
were encouraged to implement internal control audits. In
2012, all listed firms were required to implement compulsory
auditing for internal control, namely, the Chinese version of
the SOX 404. This study aims to fill the gap as it relates to
the introduction of the SOX Act in China.
Second, this study enhances the relevant literature related
to internal control and audit quality. Goh et al. (2013) find
that internal control and audit opinions are the joint products
of the auditing process. However, their findings are limited to
firms with internal control deficiencies andmodified auditing
opinions. This study is more generalised to investigate the
relations between internal control quality and both unmod-
ified and modified audit opinions. Finally, this study adds
to the literature regarding the impact of product markets on
corporate governance. This study also discusses the positive
role regarding the relation between external governance and
audit opinions.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The
next section reviews the related literature on product-market
competition, internal controls and audit opinions. Section
3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the study’s
empirical design. This section includes the sample selection
and introduces the data sources, the definitions and measure-
ment of the variables, and the setup for the metrology model.
Section 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables
and the results based on regression analysis, and the results
of a robustness test are also described. Section 6 concludes
by illustrating the contribution to the literature.
2. Literature review
There are increasing empirical findings regarding internal
control after the enactment of the SOX Act. Based on the
perspective of information economics, the extant studies
document that the improvement in internal control quality
increases with the transparency of corporate information,
thereby improving the quality of financial reporting and cor-
porate governance. Moreover, an improvement in internal
control quality will lead to an increase in the quality of ac-
counting information. Doyle et al. (2007) and Altamuro
and Beatty (2010) demonstrate that internal controls can im-
prove the accrual quality and prevent or correct false or in-
accurate reports. Accordingly, the earnings information qual-
ity of firms that implement mandatory audits has been im-
proved. Goh and Li (2011) argue that internal control can
enhance the important characteristics of accounting inform-
ation quality, specifically, conservatism. Strong internal con-
trols further enhance corporate governance by improving the
spillover effects of the information environment. Lenard et al.
(2016) find that firms with internal control deficiencies are
more likely to use real earnings management to implement
earnings manipulation, while those that achieve compliance
report less satisfactory performance levels the next year. Fur-
thermore, firms with high-quality internal control can effect-
ively suppress this type of surplus manipulation, which devi-
ates from the production and operation objectives.
Bauer (2016) concludes that internal control as a gov-
ernance element can unite the goals of shareholders andman-
agers, thereby reducing associated agency costs, and that
spillover effects not only affect the quality of financial in-
formation but also influence tax avoidance. Bauer (2016)
finds that firms with significant internal control with respect
to taxation have a significantly lower level of tax avoidance.
The improvement in internal control quality increases with
shareholders’ interests. A few studies examine the relation
between internal control quality and auditor behaviour. For
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example, Altamuro and Beatty (2010) find that after the en-
actment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act, auditors are more likely to issue unmodified
audit opinions. Goh et al. (2013) determine that firms with
financial distress exhibit a positive association between in-
ternal control deficiencies andmodified audit opinions issued
by continuing auditors. Yang et al. (2009), Qin (2011) and
Xiao and Li (2012) demonstrate that high internal control
quality increases with auditors’ risk acceptance for firms.
Internal control is an effective mechanism of informa-
tion assurance and internal governance, while the product-
market is viewed as an effective external governance mech-
anism. Many studies explore the role of product-market gov-
ernance in promoting corporate value (Bhagat and Black,
1999) and strengthening the governance efficiency of the
board of directors (Song et al., 2009) while curbing excessive
investments by managers (Zhang and Wang, 2010). Based
on the perspective of information quality, Marciukaityte et
al. (2009) and Balakrishnan and Cohen (2011) determine
that product-market competition prompts firms to improve
the quality of information and reduce the possibility of inac-
curate statements. A few studies link product-market compet-
ition to auditor risk perception (Leventis et al., 2011; Zhou
and Zhou, 2014). From the perspective of auditing fees,
product-market competition affects the risk perception of the
auditor, thereby affecting auditing fees. Internal control and
product-market competition are, respectively, considered as
internal corporate governance and external governance.
3. Hypotheses development
Based on the above statements, high-quality internal con-
trol improves a firm’s access to unmodified audit opinions.
The higher a firm’s internal control quality is, the higher the
quality of the accounting information produced by the firm.
Accordingly, an auditor is more likely to issue unmodified
audit opinions. In addition, there are studies on accounting
conservatism (Goh and Li, 2011) and on the timeliness of
information disclosure that verify that high-quality internal
control improves the quality of the firm’s accounting inform-
ation (Holder et al., 2016).
High-quality internal controls improve the information en-
vironment, thereby creating spillover effects that reduce the
firm’s operating and financial risks. Auditors reduce the un-
certainty of the firm’s future judgements, and thus, they are
more likely to issue unmodified audit opinions. Arping and
Sautner (2013) and Lee et al. (2014) conclude that the
higher the quality of internal control is, the lower the in-
formation asymmetry of the firm. Thus, operating efficiency
(Feng, 2015) and investment efficiency (D’Mello et al., 2017)
are higher. Based on the above analysis, this study proposes
that:
H1: The internal control quality of listed firms is
positively related to the likelihood that unmod-
ified opinions will be issued by CPAs.
Effective internal control can effectively improve the qual-
ity of financial information and reduce a firm’s future risks.
CPAs are more willing to provide unmodified audit opinions
in such situations. An important issue is whether the product-
market competition, as an important external governance
mechanism, also influences the audit opinions issued by the
CPAs, and if so, what effect the product-market competition
will have. Due to the more intensive product-market com-
petition and the great risks faced by firms, firms are more
likely to establish quality transparent information disclosure
as well as quality risk management and control. Accordingly,
CPAs are more willing to issue unmodified audit opinions for
these firms. The higher the degree of product-market com-
petition is, the more likely the CPA is to issue unmodified
audit opinions. Therefore, product-market competition is an
alternative mechanism for the internal control of firms.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Al-Najjar and Rong (2014)
find that the more intensive the product-market competition
is, the more helpful the firm’s information environment, the
lower the asymmetry in the information of investors, and the
higher the quality of corporate financial reporting. In addi-
tion, product-market competition enables managers to optim-
ise business management and reduce business and financial
risks, all of which provide positive incentives (Bhagat and
Black, 1999; Mahdi et al., 2017). Product-market competi-
tion has a positive impact that can improve the information
environment and governance efficiency. Therefore, this study
proposes the second research hypothesis as follows:
H2: Product-market competition is positively
related to the likelihood that unmodified opin-
ions will be issued by CPAs.
According to the theory of information economics, the
internal control quality of internal governance mechanisms
and the product-market competition of external governance
mechanisms play positive roles in promoting the firm’s in-
formation environment, improving the quality of its finan-
cial information, and enhancing its corporate governance ef-
ficiency. Previous research suggests that high-quality internal
controls play a greater role in promoting corporate tax avoid-
ance and investment efficiency (D’Mello et al., 2017) in poor
information environments. Thus, internal control enhances
the financial information (Jordan and Clark, 1996; D’Mello
et al., 2017).
However, intensive product-market competition forces
firms to implement strong governance and to create a pos-
itive information environment. Therefore, firms can replace
internal controls with the product-market competition of ex-
ternal governance mechanisms to improve the quality of the
corporate information. Xiao and Li (2012) and Mahdi et
al. (2017) investigate the relation between product-market
and internal governance and find that in a highly competit-
ive market, strong internal governance is insignificant, sug-
gesting that product-market competition creates an alternat-
ive relation with corporate governance. Therefore, this study
proposes that:
H3: Product-market competition can weaken
the positive relation between internal control
quality and the likelihood that unmodified opin-
ions will be issued by CPAs.
A large number of studies (e.g., Bhagat and Black, 1999;
Kruse and Rennie, 2006; Cohen et al., 2010) indicate that
product-market competition leads firms to improve corporate
governance and financial information quality. However, the
market in which the firm is located is assumed to be a com-
pletely competitive market, even though a monopoly formed
in the industry due to legal controls may lead to market fail-
ure. Monopoly is characterised by a lack of product-market
competition to produce the good or service. At this point,
product-market competition has only a small promotion ef-
fect for the firms. Because pricing and services are controlled
by government regulators, a firm’s share may not be the res-
ult of marketisation but rather the result of policy guidance.
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Under this circumstance, the role of product-market competi-
tion is constrained. The product-market competition in these
industries is often the result of policy, and thus, such compet-
ition leads the firm to incompletely competitive markets in
which it is not possible to put pressure on firms to improve
governance. Thus, this study proposes that:
H4: Product-market competition has a signific-
ant influence on the relation between internal
control quality and unmodified opinions only in
non-monopoly industries, not in monopoly in-
dustries.
4. Research Design
4.1. Sample selection
This study selects firms listed on the A-shares of the Shen-
zhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges from 2007-2015 as the
basic sample to investigate the impact of product-market
competition and internal control quality on audit opinions.
The data are processed as follows: (1) the study excludes
data from the financial industry because of these firms’ spe-
cial properties with regard to their accounting systems and
professional quality; (2) the study eliminates firms with miss-
ing data; (3) the study excludes firms from 2007 to 2015 by
ST1; and (4) the study rejects firms with abnormal values2.
Thus, the sample includes 15,202 observations from 2007 to
2015. The data are extracted from the Wind database, and
this study uses the internal control index of listed firms in
China from the Internal Control Index Group at Xiamen Uni-
versity, led by Professor Chen.
4.2. Variable set
The dependent variable is audit opinions, while the inde-
pendent variables are product-market competition, corpor-
ate internal control quality and the nature of the business.
This study also adds several control variables to test the hy-
potheses.
4.2.1. Dependent variable
The dependent variable is audit opinion (Opin), which in-
cludes five types of audit opinions: unqualified opinions, un-
qualified opinions with explanatory language, qualified opin-
ions, adverse and disclaimer. This study classifies the final
four types of opinions as modified opinions that take the
value of 1, while unqualified opinions take the value of 0.
4.2.2. Independent variables
(1) Internal control quality (IC)
The index is based primarily on the design principles of
the internal control evaluation system combined with the ba-
sic situation of the internal control of listed firms in China.
This study uses China’s laws and regulations and correspond-
ing documents and draws on prior internal control evalu-
ation studies to determine the five primary evaluation indic-
ators, namely, internal environment, risk assessment, control
1Special Treatment refers to those listed firms with financial distress that
are to be specially treated in the Chinese stock market.
2e.g., extreme value.
activities, information and communication, and internal su-
pervision. The indicators are composed of a series of sub-
divided evaluation indicators. In the end, the evaluation
system of this study consists of four indicators that include
five first-level indicators, 24 second-level indicators, 43 third-
level indicators, and 144 fourth-level indicators. Indicator
data are obtained through the manual collection of public in-
formation, including regular and temporary announcements
as well as company-related systems. The analytic hierarchy
process and the coefficient of variation method are used to
weight the indicators, and the weights are obtained using the
internal control index. The current internal control index is
one of the mainstream methods for measuring the quality of
the internal control of firms in China (interested readers can
refer to Chen, Dong, Han & Zhou, 2017). This study uses
the natural logarithm of the internal index of Xiamen Univer-
sity, which is a percentage with a minimum score of 0 and
a theoretical maximum of 100 points, to measure a firm’s
internal control quality. The higher the score is, the higher
the corporate internal quality. The index consists of five first-
level evaluation indicators, including internal environment
(Ie), result assessment (Ra), control activity (Ca), informa-
tion and communication (Ic) and internal supervision (Is).
This study further investigates the impact of these factors on
audit opinions to enrich Hypothesis 1.
(2) Product-market competition (HHI)
The extant studies primarily measure product-market com-
petition using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) or Con-
centration Ratio (CRn). The HHI is the sum of the total mar-
ket share of all firms in the industry, while the CRn reflects
the sum of the market share of the largest N firms in various
industries to determine whether a monopoly exists and the
concentration of the market in the industry. However, the
CRn cannot reflect the degree of influence of mutual beha-
viour among firms. Following DeFond and Park (1999), this
study adopts the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a com-
posite index of the degree of market concentration and the
sum of the total industry revenue as a percentage of eachmar-
ket’s competition in an industry to measure product-market
competition:
HHI j
n∑
i=1
S2ij
where Sij is the market share of firm i in industry j, which
is the ratio of the total sales of firm i to the total sales of
the industry, and n is the number of firms in industry j. This
study uses operating income rather than sales amount to cal-
culate the HHI. The smaller the HHI is, the more competitive
the product market is, and, conversely, the larger the HHI is,
the less competitive the product market is. This study cal-
culates various industries’ HHIs based on the classification
standard adopted by the China Securities Regulatory Com-
mission (CSRC), whereby manufacturing is divided by the
first two codes, while the others are determined only by the
first code.
(3) Nature of the industry (monopoly)
Based on the classification of monopoly industries de-
veloped by Wang (2003), this study divides industries into
monopoly industries and non-monopoly industries. There
are two main reasons for the formation of monopolies in
Chinese firms. One is that the law gives firms franchise power,
resulting in only one or a few firms operating in the market.
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Another possibility is that the market capacity may be low,
resulting in only one firm creating economies of scale. The
former is called an administrative monopoly, whereas the lat-
ter is called a natural monopoly (Wang, 2003).
The specific monopoly industries are shown in Table 1.
When the listed firms are in a monopoly industry, the Mono-
poly variable equals 1; when the listed firms are in a non-
monopoly industry, the Monopoly variable equals 0.
Table 1
The classification of monopoly industries in ChinaTable 1. The classification of mo opoly industries in China 
Natural monopoly industries Administrative monopoly industries 
1. Electric power industry 
2. Telecom industry 
3. Railway sector 
4. Civil aviation industry 
5. Highways 
6. Shipping port facilities 
7. Postal industry  
8. Pipeline transportation of natural gas 
9. City tap water 
10. City gas supply 
11. Urban residents’ heating 
12. Urban sewage 
1. Oil and petroleum products 
2. Radio 
3. Wireless and cable TV 
4. Tobacco monopoly 
5. Salt monopoly 
 	 4.2.3. Control variables
Chow and Rice (1982) and Bao and Chen (1998) demon-
strate that firms that receive unmodified audit opinions have
significantly higher levels of liquidity and profitability but a
lower asset-to-liability ratio. Carcello and Neal (2000) and
Mutehler et al. (1997) find that the probability of receiving
modified audit opinions increases with increased corporate
scale. Lennox (2000) and Reynolds and Francis (2000) as-
sert that the probability of receiving modified audit opinions
is lower due to the increased scale of listed firms. However,
Carcello and Neal (2000) find that there is no significant re-
lation between corporate scale and audit opinions. Teoh and
Lim (1996) and Honghton and Jubb (1999) illustrate that
the audit fee has a significantly negative impact on the in-
dependence of the CPA. Bao and Chen (1998) find that the
asset-to-liability ratio, losses, total return on assets and home
region of listed firms influence audit opinions.
In China, Fang et al. (2004) find that CPAs are more likely
to issue modified audit opinions for firms with losses, law-
suits, and high asset-to-liability ratios. Cai et al. (2005)
demonstrate that the scale of corporate assets, the total asset
turnover, and the asset-to-liability ratio are key factors that
influence the type of audit opinion issued. Lee et al. (2014)
find that listed firms with a low audit fee and low asset-to-
liability ratios are more likely to receive modified audit opin-
ions, but firms with strong profitability and continuous oper-
ational ability are likely to receive unmodified audit opinions.
Zhao and Liu (2006) find that listed firms with a higher ratio
of largest shareholders are more likely to receive modified
audit opinions.
Therefore, this study selects the corporate scale, asset-to-
liability ratio, losses, quick ratio, audit fee, ratio of largest
shareholders and the nature of the firm as the control vari-
ables. At the same time, this study controls for the influence
of industry and year. The variable definitions are shown in
Table 2.
4.3. Regression models
To test the above hypotheses, this study establishes the fol-
lowing regression models and tests them using multivariate
Table 2
Variable definitions Table 2. Variable definitions 
Type Name Code Measure 
Dependent 
Variable Audit opinion Opin 
A modified opinion takes the 
value of 1 and 0 otherwise 
Independent 
Variables 
Internal control 
(IC) 
Index Internal index by Xiamen 
University 
Ie Internal environmental score 
Ra Risk assessment score  
Ca Control activity score  
Ics Information and communication 
score  
Is Internal supervision score  
Product-market 
competition 
HHI Measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index  
Nature of the 
industry 
Monopoly A monopoly industry takes the 
value of 1, and a non-monopoly 
industry takes the value of 0 
Control 
Variables 
Corporate scale Size The natural log of the total 
assets of the firm 
Asset-to-liability 
ratio 
Lev Total liabilities / total assets 
Loss Loss A firm showing a loss takes the 
value of 1 and 0 otherwisae 
Quick ratio Sdbl Quick assets / current liabilities 
Ratio of largest 
shareholders 
Fshare The ratio of shares held by the 
largest shareholder of the firm 
Audit fee Fee The natural log of the audit fee 
Nature of firm State A stated-owned firm takes the 
value of 1, and a non-state-
owned firm takes the value of 0 
Year Year Control  
Industry Industry Control 	
regression analysis. Logistic regression is used because the
audit opinion (Opin) of dependent variable is a 0-1 variable.
Opin = α0 + α1 log (IC) + α2Size + α3Lev +
α4Fshare+ α5sdbl+ α6Loss+ α7Fee+ α8
∑
year+
α9
∑
Industry+ ϵ (1)
Opin = α0 +α1HHI+α2Size+α3Lev+α4Fshare+
α5sdbl+α6Lossα7Feeα8
∑
yearϵ (2)
Opin = α0 + α1 log (Index) + α2HHI + α3 Index ×
HHI+α4Size+α5Lev+α6Fshare+α7sdbl+α8Loss+
α9Fee+α10
∑
year+ ϵ (3)
Opin = α0 + α1 log (Index) + α2HHI + α3 Index ×
HHI+α4Size+α5Lev+α6Fshare+α7sdbl+α8Loss+
α9Fee+α10State+α11
∑
year+ ϵ (4)
This study uses model (1) to test Hypothesis 1, model
(2) to test Hypothesis 2, model (3) to test Hypothesis 3
and model (4) to test Hypothesis 4. This study divides
sample firms into monopolistic and non-monopolistic in-
dustry groups to conduct regression model (4) to test Hypo-
thesis 4. Meanwhile, IC in the model is based on the total
internal control index (Index) or one of the first-level assess-
ment indicators in the internal control index, including in-
ternal environment (Ie), risk assessment (Ra), control activ-
ity (Ca), information and communication (Ic) or internal su-
pervision (Is).
5. Empirical tests and analysis
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the full sample,
while Table 4 shows the sub-sample descriptive statistics of
the sample firms receiving modified and unmodified audit
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opinions. Table 3 shows that the proportion of sample firms
receiving modified audit opinions is small, at only 2.6%. The
average internal control score is 42.772, which indicates that
the internal control systems of listed firms is currently poor
in China and should be strengthened. The mean of the HHI
is only 0.105, which indicates that most of the listed firms’
industries are still highly competitive. The maximum of the
HHI is 0.987, while the minimum is 0.018, which shows that
the intensity of market competition differs for the listed firms’
industries. The mean of Monopoly is only 0.065, which indic-
ates that most listed firms are in non-monopoly industries,
and few are in monopoly industries. The results seem to sug-
gest that the systemic reform of China’s monopolistic indus-
tries has achieved great progress.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the full sampleTable 3. Descriptive statistics of the full sample 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Opin 15202 0.026 0.158 0.000 1.000 
Index 15202 42.772 9.283 3.862 75.002 
Ie 15202 34.767 12.004 0.868 86.138 
Ra 15202 26.811 17.257 0.000 87.734 
Ca 15202 62.882 16.354 0.000 98.800 
Ic 15202 51.451 12.456 1.471 97.504 
Is 15202 40.053 16.425 0.095 96.842 
HHI 15202 0.105 0.098 0.018 0.987 
Monopoly 15202 0.065 0.246 0.000 1.000 
Size 15202 21.874 1.277 17.388 28.509 
Lev 15202 0.441 0.215 0.007 0.998 
Sdbl 15202 1.997 2.867 0.156 18.955 
Loss 15202 0.084 0.277 0.000 1.000 
Fshare 15202 0.359 0.154 0.003 0.900 
Fee 15202 1051795.000 2858987.000 4000.000 119000000.000 
State 15202 0.413 0.492 0.000 1.000 
All variables as previously defined. 	All variables as previously defined.
As shown in Table 4, compared with listed firms that re-
ceive unmodified opinions, those that receive modified opin-
ions have lower overall scores on internal control and on the
five factors of internal control, thus indicating poor internal
control. In addition, their product-market competition scores
are higher, which indicates that their product-market com-
petition is not intense. Finally, listed firms with high asset-
to-liability ratios, small corporate scales and low quick ratios
are more likely to be issued modified audit opinions because
of their high operating risk.
Table 4
Sub-sample descriptive statisticsTable 4. Sub-sample descriptive statistics 
 Sub-sample of modified opinions Sub-sample of unmodified opinions 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max 
Index 33.905 9.758 13.607 57.667 43.006 9.155 3.862 75.002 
Ie 25.112 11.585 2.408 67.852 35.022 11.910 0.868 86.138 
Ra 21.293 16.501 0.000 76.531 26.956 17.253 0.000 87.734 
Ca 49.721 16.816 16.472 92.297 63.229 16.198 0.000 98.800 
Ic 42.577 11.466 12.677 80.376 51.686 12.396 1.471 97.504 
Is 34.531 17.482 4.609 86.565 40.199 16.372 0.095 96.842 
HHI 0.120 0.114 0.018 0.987 0.105 0.098 0.018 0.984 
Monopoly 0.059 0.236 0.000 1.000 0.065 0.246 0.000 1.000 
Size 21.008 1.294 17.388 23.947 21.897 1.268 17.998 28.509 
Lev 0.588 0.231 0.040 0.997 0.437 0.213 0.007 0.998 
Sdbl 1.171 1.781 0.156 18.955 2.019 2.887 0.156 18.955 
Loss 0.432 0.496 0.000 1.000 0.075 0.263 0.000 1.000 
Fshare 0.293 0.141 0.040 0.724 0.361 0.154 0.003 0.900 
Fee 687292 455473 150000 4000000 1061418 2894916 4000 119000000 
State 0.353 0.478 0.000 1.000 0.415 0.493 0.000 1.000 	
All variables as previously defined.
5.2. Logistic regression analysis
This study uses logistic regression analysis to estimate vari-
ous variables and test the hypotheses. The results of the re-
gression analysis are shown in Table 5 to Table 7. Table 5
shows the empirical results of Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis
3 using model (1), model (2) and model (3), respectively.
Table 6 shows the influence of the five factors of internal
control on the type of audit opinions issued. Table 7 shows
the empirical results of Hypothesis 4 regarding the different
impacts of product-market competition on the association
between internal control and audit opinions in monopoly and
non-monopoly industries.
Model (1) in Table 5 examines the impact of internal con-
trol quality on audit opinions. The regression results reveal
that the regression coefficient for the natural logarithm of
the internal control scores, i.e., log(Index), is -2.993 and is
significant at the 1 per cent level. The results indicate a pos-
itive relation between internal control quality and unmodi-
fied audit opinions, which means that CPAs are more likely
to issue unmodified audit opinions for listed firms with high
internal control quality. Thus, H1a is supported.
Model (2) in Table 5 examines the impact of product-
market competition on audit opinions. The regression res-
ults reveal that the regression coefficient of the HHI is 1.596
and is significant at the 1 per cent level, indicating that listed
firms in less competitive industries are more likely to receive
modified audit opinions. With more intense product-market
competition, managers are more willing to spend more time
and energy on corporate governance and risk responses to
reduce the probability of being dismissed and the risk of un-
employment due to corporate bankruptcy, which leads to an
improvement in the principal-agent relation, decreased earn-
ings management and improved accuracy of financial state-
ments. As a result, CPAs are more likely to issue unmodified
audit opinions. Accordingly, product-market competition has
a positive influence on the likelihood of CPAs issuing unmod-
ified audit opinions, which supports H2.
Table 5
Results of internal control quality as measured by internal control scoresTab e 5. Res lts of internal con rol quality as measured by internal control scores 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Log(Index) -2.993*** 
(-12.94) 
 -2.551*** 
(-8.71) 
HHI  1.596*** 
(3.21) 
5.189*** 
(2.80) 
HHI*Index   
 
-0.112** 
(-2.04) 
Size -0.641*** 
(-11.01) 
-0.819*** 
(-14.84) 
-0.637*** 
(-11.15) 
Lev 3.787*** 
(11.76) 
4.077*** 
(13.04) 
3.549*** 
(11.21) 
Sdbl 0.043 
(1.32) 
0.017 
(0.51) 
0.027 
(0.80) 
Loss 1.465*** 
(11.78) 
1.507*** 
(12.61) 
1.506*** 
(12.27) 
Fee 7.12e-08*** 
(2.90) 
6.99e-08*** 
(2.89) 
7.33e-08*** 
(3.12) 
Fshare -1.467*** 
(-3.37) 
-1.723*** 
(-4.05) 
-1.339*** 
(-3.12) 
_cons 19.120*** 
(13.37) 
12.070*** 
(10.36) 
17.930*** 
(12.15) 
Year control control control 
Industry control   
Pseudo!! 27.31% 22.01% 26.60% 
LRchi2 990.80 799.84 966.60 
All variables as previously defined. ***, **, and * indicate  
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
The t-value is inside parentheses. 
 Model (3) in Table 5 examines the interaction effect of
internal control quality and product-market competition on
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audit opinions. The interaction coefficient of product-market
competition and internal control quality is -0.112 and is sig-
nificant at the 5 per cent level. The marginal impact of high
internal control quality on audit opinions is -2.439 (=-2.551-
(-0.112)) in low product-market competition, while the cor-
responding impact is -2.551 in high product-market competi-
tion. The results seem to suggest that firms with high internal
control quality in low product-market competition are more
likely to receive unmodified audit opinions. As the product-
market competition becomes increasingly intense, the posit-
ive relation between internal control quality and audit opin-
ions weakens. The product-market competition can, to some
extent, weaken the positive association between internal con-
trol quality and unmodified audit opinions issued by CPAs,
which supports Hypothesis H3.
Models (4) to (8) in Table 6 examine the impact of the
five factors of internal control on audit opinions. The regres-
sion results indicate that the regression coefficient of the nat-
ural logarithm of the internal environment scores, risk assess-
ment scores, control activity scores, information and commu-
nication scores, and internal supervision scores are -1.065,
-0.156, -1.676, -2.457, -0.464, respectively, and they are all
significant at the 1 per cent level, indicating that CPAs are
more likely to issue unmodified audit opinions when there
is a positive internal environment, perfect risk assessment
and control activity, efficient information and communica-
tion and effective internal supervision. The results further
support H1 and contribute to the literature on the impact of
internal control quality on audit opinions.
Table 6
Results of the impact of the five internal control factors on audit opinionsTable 6. Re ults of the impact of the five inter al contr l factors on audit opinions 
Variable Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
Log (Ie) -1.065*** 
(-10.31) 
    
Log (Ra)  -0.156*** 
(-3.66) 
   
Log (Ca)   -1.676*** 
(-9.73) 
  
Log (Ic)    -2.457*** 
(-10.88) 
 
Log (Is)     -0.464*** 
(-4.94) 
Size -0.716*** 
(-12.42) 
-0.815*** 
(-14.32) 
-0.728*** 
(-12.74) 
-0.739*** 
(-12.85) 
-0.804*** 
(-14.21) 
Lev 3.976*** 
(12.43) 
4.205*** 
(13.13) 
3.779*** 
(11.77) 
3.970*** 
(12.35) 
4.250*** 
(13.36) 
Sdbl 0.044 
(1.36) 
0.039 
(1.18) 
0.029 
(0.88) 
0.030 
(0.90) 
0.042 
(1.28) 
Loss 1.468*** 
(11.97) 
1.490*** 
(12.19) 
1.450*** 
(11.81) 
1.426*** 
(11.56) 
1.505*** 
(12.39) 
Fee 7.05e-08*** 
(2.89) 
7.11e-08*** 
(2.89) 
6.12e-08** 
(2.23) 
7.74e-08*** 
(3.01) 
6.84e-08*** 
(2.76) 
Fshare -1.604*** 
(-3.71) 
-1.734*** 
(-3.99) 
-1.594*** 
(-3.67) 
-1.889*** 
(-4.30) 
-1.783*** 
(-4.13) 
_cons 12.940*** 
(9.88) 
12.160*** 
(9.34) 
16.850*** 
(12.00) 
19.600*** 
(12.92) 
13.080*** 
(9.91) 
Year control control control control control 
Industry control control control control control 
Pseudo!! 25.42% 22.89% 25.18% 26.22% 23.37% 
LRchi2 922.19 817.04 913.60 951.26 847.82 
All variables as previously defined. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-value is inside parentheses. 	
Model (9) and model (10) in Table 7 examine the influ-
ence of product-market competition on the positive relation
between internal control quality and audit opinions in mono-
poly and non-monopoly industries. Model (9) shows the em-
pirical results in non-monopoly industries, which are consist-
ent with the results of the full-sample regression. The re-
gression coefficient of the natural logarithm of the internal
control scores is -2.560 and is significant at the 1 per cent
level, indicating that there is a positive relation between in-
ternal control quality and unmodified audit opinions issued
by CPAs in non-monopoly industries. The better the internal
control quality of the listed firms is, the more willing CPAs
are to issue unmodified audit opinions.
The regression coefficient of the HHI is 6.439 and is signi-
ficant at the 1 per cent level, which indicates that product-
market competition provides an external governance mech-
anism in non-monopoly industries. CPAs are more likely to
issue unmodified opinions to firms in highly competitive mar-
kets. The interaction coefficient of product-market competi-
tion and internal control quality is -0.152 and is significant
at the 1 per cent level, thus indicating that product-market
competition weakens the positive relation between internal
control quality and unmodified audit opinions issued by CPAs
in non-monopoly industries.
However, in monopoly industries, the coefficients of in-
ternal control quality, product-market competition and the
interaction coefficient of product-market competition and in-
ternal control quality are not significant, which indicates that
internal control quality and product-market competition fail
to provide effective governance effects in monopoly indus-
tries.
Table 7
Regression results in monopoly industries and non-monopoly industriesTable 7. Regression results in m n poly industries and non-monopoly industries 
Variable Model (9) Model (10) 
Log(Index) -2.560*** 
(-8.50) 
-1.937 
(-1.24) 
HHI 6.439*** 
(3.31) 
-4.607 
(-0.56) 
HHI*Index -0.152*** 
(-2.59) 
0.200 
(0.95) 
Size -0.611*** 
(-9.97) 
-1.200*** 
(-4.57) 
Lev 3.422*** 
(10.49) 
6.686*** 
(3.87) 
Sdbl 0.028 
(0.84) 
0.057 
(0.32) 
Loss 1.527*** 
(12.03) 
1.061** 
(1.99) 
Fee 0.000000108*** 
(2.93) 
-0.0000000424 
(0.26) 
Fshare -1.740*** 
(-3.77) 
2.854** 
(2.01) 
State 0.078 
(0.60) 
-0.467 
(-0.88) 
_cons 17.610*** 
(11.20) 
23.450*** 
(3.50) 
Year control control 
Industry   
N 14220 982 
Pseudo!! 26.98% 35.10% 
LRchi2 921.69 76.56 
All variables as previously defined. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. The t-value is inside parentheses. 
 
The results in Table 5 to Table 7 seem to suggest that
product-market competition has a substitution effect that
makes up for the negative impact of poor internal control
quality in non-monopoly industries. However, monopoly in-
dustries can cause market failures, so internal control quality
and product-market competition fail to provide governance
effects. Accordingly, the listed firms can effectively com-
bine internal governance mechanisms (internal control) and
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external governance mechanisms (product-market competi-
tion) to ensure accurate financial statements.
5.3. Robustness test
To strengthen and regulate corporations’ internal control,
China’s Ministry of Finance, together with the relevant de-
partments, established a standards committee on the internal
control of firms on July 15, 2006, and released a draft of
‘Internal control specifications–basic specifications’, which in-
cluded 17 specifications, on March 2, 2007. In addition, ‘The
basic code of the internal controls of enterprise’ was officially
published on May 22, 2008, and was implemented on July 1,
2009. The data for the sample firms utilised in this study
were collected for the period between 2007 and 2015, so it
is necessary to consider the robustness of the results. As ‘The
basic code of the internal controls of enterprise’ was imple-
mented for listed firms on July 1, 2009, the sample period
of this study can be divided into two periods, from 2007 to
2008 and from 2009 to 2015.
Table 8 shows the results of the robustness test, andmodels
(11) to (13) show the regression results for the period from
2007 to 2008. The results of model (11) display the positive
effects of internal control quality on unmodified audit opin-
ions, while the results of model (12) reveal the positive re-
lation between product-market competition and unmodified
audit opinions issued by CPAs.
Table 8
Regression results for the sub-sample yearsTab e 8. Regression results fo  the sub-sample years 
 2007-2008 2009-2015 
Variable Model  
(11) 
Model 
(12) 
Model  
(13) 
Model 
(14) 
Model 
(15) 
Model  
(16) 
Log(Index) -3.125*** 
(-5.13) 
 -2.264*** 
(-2.88) 
-3.042*** 
(-12.04) 
 -2.565*** 
(-7.73) 
HHI  2.171** 
(2.11) 
5.365 
(1.12) 
 1.423** 
(2.51) 
5.659** 
(2.47) 
HHI*Index   -0.131 
(-0.72) 
  -0.122* 
(-1.90) 
Size -0.468*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.648*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.488*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.673*** 
(-10.60) 
-0.848*** 
(-14.16) 
-0.664*** 
(-10.69) 
Lev 2.932*** 
(3.24) 
3.110*** 
(3.51) 
2.397*** 
(2.70) 
3.986*** 
(11.50) 
4.223*** 
(12.60) 
3.731*** 
(10.98) 
Sdbl 0.093 
(0.77) 
0.033 
(0.25) 
0.053 
(0.44) 
0.047 
(1.38) 
0.020 
(0.57) 
0.030 
(0.86) 
Loss 1.577*** 
(4.76) 
1.818*** 
(5.75) 
1.675*** 
(5.20) 
1.444*** 
(10.69) 
1.461*** 
(11.27) 
1.481*** 
(11.11) 
Fee 2.91e-08 
(0.31) 
2.27e-08 
(0.21) 
3.54e-08 
(0.43) 
9.81e-08*** 
(2.94) 
9.25e-08*** 
(2.83) 
1.03e-07*** 
(2.99) 
Fshare -0.865 
(-0.75) 
-1.084 
(-0.99) 
-0.709 
(-0.64) 
-1.577*** 
(-3.34) 
-1.810*** 
(-3.91) 
-1.427*** 
(-3.07) 
_cons 15.350*** 
(3.99) 
8.100** 
(2.46) 
12.830*** 
(3.15) 
19.730*** 
(12.58) 
12.650*** 
(10.05) 
18.47*** 
(11.29) 
Year control control control control control control 
Industry control   control   
Pseudo!! 27.81% 19.54% 24.47% 27.94% 22.46% 27.03% 
LRchi2 135.09 95.17 119.22 876.80 706.35 849.85 
All variables as previously defined. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-value is inside 
parenthe-ses. 
 
 However, the coefficient of the interaction between
product-market competition and internal control quality is
negative and not significant based on the results of model
(13), which means that the substitution effect is not signific-
ant in the relation between internal control quality and un-
modified audit opinions issued by CPAs. Product-market com-
petition does not have a significant substitution effect on the
association between internal control quality and unmodified
audit opinions. A possible explanation for this result is that,
in 2007, China began to introduce the SOX Act. At that time,
the Chinese government’s implementation of internal control
quality construction was strong, and many firms began to
attach importance to the establishment of internal control.
Hence, this result may be due to the promotion of the SOX
Act in China, a factor that has led to significant improvement
in the quality of China’s internal control over that in the past.
Accordingly, compared with those in the past, firms have
now shifted from external governance that is more depend-
ent on product-market competition to internal control qual-
ity that relies on internal corporate governance. As a result,
the correlation between the 2007-2008 product-market com-
petition and the auditor’s audit opinions declined to become
insignificant. Models (14) to (16) present the regression res-
ults for the period 2009 to 2015. These results are consistent
with the previous results, thus indicating that the findings of
this study are robust.
Table 9
Regression results of the robustness testTable 8. Regr ssion re ults for the sub-sample years 
Variable Model  
(17) 
Model 
(18) 
Model  
(19) 
Model 
(20) 
Model 
(21) 
Log(Index) -2.993*** 
(-12.94) 
 -2.583*** 
(-8.65) 
-2.620*** 
(-8.66) 
-2.196 
(-0.74) 
PMC  0.192* 
(1.73) 
0.906** 
(2.14) 
1.167*** 
(2.67) 
-3.129 
(-0.87) 
PCM*Index   -0.021* 
(-1.81) 
-0.027** 
(-2.29) 
0.047 
(0.51) 
Size -0.641*** 
(-11.01) 
-0.829*** 
(-15.08) 
-0.645*** 
(-11.36) 
-0.623*** 
(-10.22) 
-1.213*** 
(-4.56) 
Lev 3.787*** 
(11.76) 
4.048*** 
(13.01) 
3.537*** 
(11.18) 
3.413*** 
(10.47) 
6.315*** 
(3.78) 
Sdbl 0.043 
(1.32) 
0.027 
(0.80) 
0.028 
(0.85) 
0.028 
(0.83) 
0.039 
(0.21) 
Loss 1.465*** 
(11.78) 
1.496*** 
(12.52) 
1.492*** 
(12.17) 
1.508*** 
(11.89) 
1.113** 
(2.06) 
Fee 7.12e-
08*** 
(2.90) 
7.28e-
08*** 
(2.97) 
7.51e-
08*** 
(3.22) 
0.00000011
2*** 
(3.03) 
5.10e-08 
(0.31) 
Fshare -1.467*** 
(-3.37) 
-1.700*** 
(-4.01) 
-1.309*** 
(-3.06) 
-1.714*** 
(-3.73) 
2.911** 
(2.06) 
State    0.065 
(0.50) 
-0.599 
(-1.09) 
_cons 19.120**
* 
(13.37) 
12.340*** 
(10.67) 
18.250*** 
(12.14) 
18.090*** 
(11.50) 
26.780** 
(2.15) 
Year control control control control control 
Industry control     
Pseudo!! 27.31% 21.83% 26.41% 26.81% 34.36% 
All variables as previously defined. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The 
t-value is inside parentheses. 
 
 
Product-market competition as measured by the HHI re-
mains controversial, as no uniform index has been identi-
fied to measure it effectively. This study employs the mean
of the number of listed firms in different industries and di-
vides the industries into product-market competition that is
intense and product-market competition that is not intense.
If the number of listed firms in the industry is less than the
mean value that takes the value of 1, then the industry is
not considered to have intense product-market competition
(PMC=1). If the number of listed firms in the industry is
more than the mean value that takes the value of 1, then the
industry is considered to have intense product-market com-
petition (PMC=0). The regression results are shown in Table
9. Model (17) in Table 9 shows the impact of internal control
quality on audit opinions. Model (18) shows the impact of
product-market competition on audit opinions. Model (19)
shows the impact of internal control quality and product-
market competition on audit opinions. Model (20) shows
the impact of internal control quality and product-market
competition on audit opinions in non-monopoly industries.
Model (21) shows the impact of internal control quality and
product-market competition on audit opinions in monopoly
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industries. As shown in Table 9, the results of the robustness
test are consistent with the previous results, thus indicating
that the results of this study are robust.
Table 10 shows the regression results using the probit
method. Model (22) shows the impact of internal control
quality on audit opinions. Model (23) shows the impact of
product-market competition on audit opinions. Model (24)
shows the impact of internal control quality and product-
market competition on audit opinions. Model (24) in Table
10 shows that the coefficients for internal control quality and
product-market competition are -1.213 and 2.468, respect-
ively, and significant at the 1 per cent level, indicating that
to some extent, the internal control quality has a substitu-
tion effect on product-market competition. The coefficient
for the HHI*Index is -0.050 and significant at the 5 per cent
level, suggesting that internal control quality has a lower
marginal impact on audit opinions than product-market com-
petition. Model (25) shows the impact of internal control
quality and product-market competition on audit opinions in
non-monopoly industries. Model (26) shows the impact of
internal control quality and product-market competition on
audit opinions in monopoly industries. As shown in Table 10,
the results of the robustness test are consistent with the pre-
vious results, thus indicating that the results of this study are
robust.
Table 10
Regression results of the full samples based on the probit methodTable 10 Regression results of the full samples based on the probit method 
Variable Model  
(22) 
Model 
(23) 
Model  
(24) 
Model 
(25) 
Model 
(26) 
Log(Index) -1.416*** 
(-12.93) 
 -1.213*** 
(-8.65) 
-1.219*** 
(-8.43) 
-0.747 
(-1.08) 
HHI  0.777*** 
(3.39) 
2.468*** 
(2.70) 
3.108*** 
(3.21) 
-2.372 
(-0.64) 
HHI*Index   -0.050** 
(-1.97) 
-0.070** 
(-2.54) 
0.082 
(0.89) 
Size -0.292*** 
(-10.73) 
-0.370*** 
(-14.53) 
-0.288*** 
(-10.78) 
-0.282*** 
(-9.77) 
-0.443*** 
(-3.80) 
Lev 1.860*** 
(12.13) 
1.945*** 
(13.28) 
1.729*** 
(11.56) 
1.685*** 
(10.89) 
2.581*** 
(3.38) 
sdbl 0.026** 
(1.97) 
0.016 
(1.18) 
0.019 
(1.42) 
0.019 
(1.42) 
0.027 
(0.38) 
Loss 0.710*** 
(11.68) 
0.745*** 
(12.86) 
0.727*** 
(12.12) 
0.737*** 
(11.87) 
0.629** 
(2.43) 
Fee 3.21e-
08*** 
(2.62) 
3.09e-
08*** 
(2.64) 
3.29e-
08*** 
(2.72) 
4.70e-08*** 
(2.74) 
-1.29e-08 
(-0.08) 
Fshare -0.662*** 
(-3.46) 
-0.677*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.578*** 
(-3.07) 
-0.738*** 
(-3.67) 
1.229* 
(1.83) 
State    0.0371 
(0.62) 
-0.304 
(-1.26) 
_cons 8.712*** 
(13.19) 
5.077*** 
(9.50) 
7.959*** 
(11.38) 
7.923*** 
(10.57) 
8.049*** 
(2.77) 
Year control control control control control 
Industry control     
Pseudo!! 27.30% 21.83% 26.46% 26.92% 32.17% 
All variables as previously defined. ***, **, and * indicate sig-
nificance. 
 
 
6. Conclusion
This study uses data on listed firms in the Shanghai and
Shenzhen A-share stock markets to demonstrate the impact
of product-market competition and internal control quality
on audit opinions. The findings of this study are as follows.
(1) The results are consistent with the hypotheses. CPAs are
more likely to issue unqualified opinions for firms with
high internal control quality. The study further shows
that CPAs’ evaluations of the five factors of internal con-
trol influence their audit opinions. The higher their eval-
uation is, the higher probability the firm will receive an
unmodified audit opinion.
(2) There is a positive relation between product-market
competition and unmodified audit opinions. CPAs are
more likely to issue unmodified audit opinions for firms
in industries with intense product-market competition
because in such industries, managers will spend more
time and energy on corporate governance and risk re-
sponses and will strengthen their communication with
shareholders to reduce the probability of being dis-
missed and the risk of unemployment due to corpor-
ate bankruptcy, leading to improved principal-agent re-
lations and decreased earnings management. As a res-
ult, the probability of firms receiving unmodified audit
opinions is high.
(3) This study finds that product-market competition has a
substitution effect in the relation between internal con-
trol quality and audit opinions. Product-market com-
petition weakens the positive relation between internal
control quality and unmodified audit opinions issued by
CPAs. Therefore, managers should attempt to effectively
combine internal control mechanisms (internal control
quality) and external governance mechanisms (product-
market competition).
(4) This study finds that product-market competition weak-
ens the positive relation between internal control quality
and unmodified audit opinions issued by CPAs in non-
monopoly industries but not in monopoly industries.
This study demonstrates that both external governance
mechanisms (product-market competition) and internal con-
trol quality influence audit opinions in non-monopoly indus-
tries but not in monopoly industries. Therefore, the appropri-
ate construction of internal controls is essential to strengthen-
ing or establishing effective market-competition mechanisms,
and accelerating the systemic reform of China’s monopoly in-
dustries will improve the quality of information disclosure
and protect the interests of investors.
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